While Researchers Say Bitcoin Has Time on Quantum Security, Not Everyone Agrees

“As much as I respect Chris and his work at Coinshares, he’s wrong on this one.”

“Betting the security of trillions of dollars in assets on ‘it’ll be slow’ is reckless.”

Pruden points to recent research from Google showing that the number of qubits required to break widely used encryption schemes may be far lower than previously believed. He also cites government mandates requiring critical infrastructure to migrate to post-quantum cryptography by 2030 as evidence that threat models are shifting.

Pruden further criticizes what he characterizes as overreliance on selective expert opinions, warning that dismissing quantum risk because timelines remain uncertain could leave digital-asset networks scrambling when migration becomes unavoidable.

He emphasizes that timelines for cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) remain deeply uncertain, and that low-probability, high-impact scenarios cannot be dismissed. Using hypothetical figures, Heilman explains in a brief X thread responding to Pruden that even a modest chance of a CRQC arriving earlier than expected becomes consequential once the multi-year effort required to develop a protocol solution—and the additional time needed for wallets and users to migrate—is taken into account.

Heilman’s central argument is that “far off” is an imprecise and often misleading phrase—some interpret it as five years, others as 30—and that the uncertainty itself is the true source of risk. Because adoption proceeds slowly and cautiously by necessity, Heilman argues that the prudent course is to begin steady, intentional progress now, reducing tail risks well before they evolve into pressing concerns.